Perceptions of changing power, dyadic rivalries and security dilemma mechanisms in the wider Black Sea area by Cioculescu, Șerban Filip
www.ssoar.info
Perceptions of changing power, dyadic rivalries and
security dilemma mechanisms in the wider Black
Sea area
Cioculescu, Șerban Filip
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Cioculescu, Ș. F. (2016). Perceptions of changing power, dyadic rivalries and security dilemma mechanisms in the
wider Black Sea area. Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review, 16(3), 377-407. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-51693-0
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
 Perceptions of Changing Power, Dyadic Rivalries 
and Security Dilemma Mechanisms  
in the Wider Black Sea Area 
 
ȘERBAN FILIP CIOCULESCU 
 
 
 
The main research question of this study concerns the possibility to 
understand the contemporary “Cold War”-like relations between Russian 
Federation and some EU/NATO countries as the emergence of a “zero-sum 
game” based on power and security calculations and on domestic political 
narratives. Are these strategic players domestically and externally coherent in 
building their strategies and actions? What kind of power tools do they use? 
Also one must ask itself if the rivalry-based visions are due to the personal 
feelings, psychologies and experiences of national leaders, to collective cultural 
issues or more to structural factors like the systemic polarity (the global 
distribution of power) and patterns of national security at the regional level. 
Because if the problem lies with the sub-state level – leader personality and 
regime type ‒, all could change if the leaders/regime would be replaced at some 
time, but if the supra-state structural factors based on power distribution and the 
cultural patterns prevail, thus the conflict between the West and Russian 
Federation will continue for a long time.  
Certainly, there are a lot of studies trying to emphasize the Russia 
versus West conflict and their actions/strategies in the Black Sea area1, but our 
goal is to focus on the parallel between real power capabilities of the involved 
nations and their perceived strength and weakness, as seen by political and 
military elites. We combine the analysis of (quantifiable) material elements 
such as weapons possession, defense investments, oil and gas assets with 
perceptions of strength and vulnerability and the need to accomplish the 
collective needs of each nation. Security dilemma mechanisms and the offense-
defence balance, as some favorite instruments used by structural neo-realists, 
will be used for explaining the ongoing crisis and tensions between Moscow 
                                                 
1
  Examples: Mitat Çelikpala, Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, “The Changing Face of Black Sea 
Security”, Ponars Eurasia, 31 May 2016; J. Bugajski, P.B. Doran, “Black Sea Rising. 
Russia’s Strategy in Southeast Europe”, Black Sea Strategic Report No.1, Center for 
European Policy Analysis, February 2016; G. Flikke (ed.), The Shifting Geopolitics of 
Black Sea Region, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2011. 
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and the EU-NATO countries which perceive its policies as a threat to European 
security. But the instruments of cognitive psychology are also interesting and 
help diminishing the extreme reliance on material factors when explaining the 
foreign policy behaviour of state leaders.  
Of course, the first question one should ask before trying to understand 
the power and security “games” in the Black Sea region is why this issue is 
important? Nobody could say that the Black Sea area is at the core of the 
struggle among word powers for future systemic hegemony, since it is far 
remote from the Asia-Pacific zone (main area of rivalry between USA and 
China, the first and second military and economic powers in the world) and it 
has only one state with a population more than 100 million (Russia) and no 
economy worthing at least 2 trillion USD by year. But the Black Sea is 
nevertheless important for European and Euro-Atlantic security since it allows 
NATO/EU countries to interact with the states of the South Caucasus and 
Central Asia, with the Middle East area, and to prevent revisionist challangers 
from contesters of the status quo inherited from the end of the Cold War. It is a 
turbulent area, experiencing civil wars, frozen conflicts, terrorism and 
immigration, also with the risk of becoming a real frontline between NATO 
states and Russia or a coalition of Eurasian powers. The BS region was defined 
as a geopolitical region after the Cold War, when the West tried to block a 
Russian attempt to come back and recreate its empire and also wanted to avoid 
the “jugoslavization” of the post-communist states.  
Nowadays, the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union is developing in 
the opposition with the European Union common market. Ukraine, Republic of 
Moldova, and Georgia have to chose and can be sanctionned by the losing side. 
Maybe some optimists dream at a cooperative and complementary framework 
among these economic blocks but we see more rivalry and competitive gains 
than cooperation, especially after Russia annexed Crimea (2014) and was 
targeted by western economic sanctions. EU abandoned talks on a new EU-
Russia Strategic Partnership Agreement and suspended discussions on visa-free 
regime for Moscow.  
The Black Sea region (or “wider Black Sea Area” ‒ WBSA ‒ if one 
includes also the Southern Caucasus’ states) must be defined as a “security 
complex”2, whose security architecture is made by the interaction of the various 
state and non-state actors, or as a geopolitical region, but this kind of decoupage 
take into account especially the visions and interests of regional and great 
powers. The riparian states are very heterogenous, they greatly differ in 
                                                 
2
  The British IR expert Barry Buzan defined the s.c. as “a group of states whose primary 
security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot 
realistically be considered apart from one another”. See Barry Buzan, People, States and 
Fear, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London 1991, p. 90. 
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territory, population, economy and strategic affilitions3. The problem is that 
these countries – Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Georgia, Ukraine and Turkey, plus 
the Republic of Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan – do not have the same 
strategic culture, or similar national interests, they do not perceive themselves, 
at the level of political and economic elites, as being part of the same area and 
having a common Black Sea identity. Even their collective norms and values 
are different: NATO countries are democracies and liberal systems (even 
Turkey which now experiences a strong authoritarian derive, one which was 
greatly enhanced after the failed coup d’Etat from July 2016), Russia is a 
psuedo-democracy, while the former Soviet states are either incipient 
democracies or authoritarian regimes. There is no collective security structure, 
no big security organisation to ensure cooperation and dialogue. The Black Sea 
region does not have a mini-NATO, no EU-like institution, no common court of 
justice and the OSCE which cover all the wider Black Sea Area (WBSA) is too 
diluted and too vast to be called a Black Sea organisation. The NATO-Russian 
Council is still paralyzed after Russia annexed Crimea. While the Turkish-
initiated organisation Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) is more a 
diplomatic tool and a forum for dialogue but lacks a strategic dimension. If the 
local countries could have perfectly complementary economies, free trade, 
transnational strong links, people to people contacts and visa-free regimes, this 
could bring in the end the emergence of a regional identity and maybe also the 
birth of a similar strategic culture. The truth is that for small states like Georgia, 
Republic of Moldova, Azerbaijan, the main players in the region – NATO, EU 
and Russian Federation are simply too big and too strong to deal with. They 
cannot freely chose their allies, they are not allowed to change their preferences 
by deciding between NATO and Russia, or between EU and Eurasian Economic 
Union, and they see that NATO and EU as a whole do not ask them to integrate 
and show their loialty, on the contrary the West keep them at its gates, as simple 
security and economic partners. Also their public opinions are heavily divided 
on which big power and protector to choose.   
                                                 
3
  Vladimir Ryabtsev, “Why Is There No ‘Security Complex’ in the Black Sea-Caucasus 
Region?”, https://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/06/Ryabtsev-en.pdf, 
accessed on May 24, 2016. The author rejects the idea that the WBSA could be a real 
security complex: “When we speak about a security complex, what we mean is a special 
regulatory mechanism. This regulatory mechanism is characterized by a quality of 
interstate interactions within a specific zone of the world (thus it is important that the 
states belong to single geographic zone), when the conditions conducive to the emergence 
of dissension, disputes, and conflicts between the states are reduced to the achievable 
minimum. At the same time, the complex provides a framework within which a 
sophisticated, efficient, and effective system of procedures, instruments, and mechanisms 
for managing crisis and conflict situations exists. This is based on a system of monitoring 
that uses a scale applicable to situations in all countries of the region, ‘tied’ with one 
organizational and conceptual ‘knot’”. See p. 98.  
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Russia is the biggest state in the region (and in the world), connecting 
the Pacific Ocean and the Black Sea, it has by far the biggest military budget in 
the WBSA and is the only riparian state to have a U.N. Security Council 
permanent seat and also the biggest number of nuclear weapons. No other Black 
Sea states has its own nuclear weapons. Together with Turkey, they are the 
inheritors of two former land-empires which in the past has been based on 
militant religions: Christian Ortodoxy and Sunni Islam. Moscow dreamed at 
being the “Third Rome” and to be the leader of the Slav populations of Eastern 
Europe (Panslavism and Orthodox solidarity)4, then leader of communist world, 
while Istanbul aspired at ruling all the (Sunni) muslim world using the 
Caliphate institutions and pretige, then at being the ruler of all Turks (Pan-
Turkism) in Eurasia5. During the Cold War they were situated in opposing 
camps, with Russia trying to force its access to the Turkish straits (consequently 
being deterred by the USA) and Ankara taking part in the US-led containment 
strategy (later assumed by NATO as a whole) and controlling the access to the 
sea for non-riparian countries by invoking the Montreux Convention of 1936. 
Without Washington standing by its side, Ankara would probably not have been 
able to ensure the respect of international law via Montreux, if confronted by a 
very assertive Soviet Russia. If Turkey will decide during a polical crisis to 
block Russia’s access through the Straits invoking the Montreux privisions 
(which stated that Turkey may deny access to states with which it is at war or in 
iminent risk of war), this would mean for Moscow a lack of maritime 
communication between the bases in Mediterranean (Tartus, Latakia etc) and 
those in the Black Sea (Sevastopol etc)6. Since Putin and Erdogan are both 
strong carismatic and risk-seeking leaders who do not like taking steps back for 
not losing popularity and domestically risk regime change, since they accept the 
brinkmanship strategy, most annalysts supposed it would have been very 
difficult to find an agreement among them7. (It seems they were wrong since in 
                                                 
4
  Vladislav B. Sotirović, “Russia’s Balkan Politics: From the Politics of Pan-Slavic 
Reciprocity of the Tsarist Russia to the ‘Realpolitic’ of the Republic of Gazprom Russia”, 
http://global-politics.eu/2016/10/18/russias-balkan-politics-politics-pan-slavic-reciprocity-
tsarist-russia-realpolitic-republic-gazprom-russia/, 18 October 2010. 
5
  Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey. A Modern History, I.B. Tauris, third edition, 2004, p. 11. 
6
  Area experts assess that, in order to defend the Straits, Turkey could suppress the 
effectiveness of Russian missiles S-400 by using the radio-electronic systems Koral, the 
Turkish F16 are more numerous on the common border than Russia’s SU 30 and SU 27, 
but if provoked Russia could react by sending strategic bombers including with nuclear 
weapons. See Armand Goşu, Euro-Falia, Curtea Veche, București, 2016, p. 254. 
7
  Daniel Treisman, “Why Putin Took Crimea”, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016 issue, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/why-putin-took-crimea. An 
opposite point of view is that of Cristian Unteanu, a Romanian foreign policy specialized 
journalist, who claims that Turkish president Erdogan and prime minister Binali Yldirin 
have sent letters of reconciliation to Russian leadership on the occasion on Russia’s 
national day on June 2016. In his letter Erdogan said: “On behalf of the Turkish people, I 
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November 2016 Erdogan mentioned again the possibility that Turkey become a 
full fledged member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, while giving up 
candidacy for EU integration.) NATO states’ leaders are anxious of possible 
Turkish initiatives to block the Black Sea access since it could prompt a strong 
Russian response8. But at the same time they can hardly let alone Turkey if in a 
vital “zero-sum game” with Russia, because a defeated Ankara would mean the 
fall of NATO’s south-eastern flank.  
However, since the Turkish economy was strongly hit by Russian 
sanctions and after Moscow gave up the plans for a new gas pipeline to Turkey 
(Turkish Stream), Turkish president took advantage of the failed coup of July 
2016 and thanked Russian president for his warm support (at the same time 
Turkish officials often blamed US government for not allowing the extradition 
of the famous cleric Fethulah Gülen, a resident of Pennsylvania, who is accused 
by Erdogan and his government to have been behind the coup attempt), then 
Erdogan apologized for the destroyed Russian jet and the dead pilot. Then, on 
August 9, Erdogan traveled to Moscow and managed to partially rebuild the 
relations with Russia, at the level of trade and energy projects9. Of course, this 
“honey-moon” between the two nations could end abruptly because of their 
contrary interests in Syria and Ukraine. 
Currently, the western shore of the Black Sea belongs to the West, via 
EU and NATO, while the East and North-East belong to Russian Federation, 
which sees itself more and more as NATO and EU’s main military and 
ideological adversary10. In between, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova try to make 
themselves accepted by the EU/NATO while trying to avoid open conflict with 
Moscow. Ukraine also wants to recover the lost territory of Crimea but its 
chances are dim as nobody in NATO/EU would risk a military conflict with 
Moscow for supporting Kyiv’s legitimate claims. Moldova and Georgia are 
splited between Russian Eurasian project and the West. The “orange” 
revolutions which brought pro-western governments in these three former 
                                                                                                                       
celebrate the National Day of the Russian people. I also hope that relations between Russia and 
Turkey reach the level they deserve in the near future”. “Turkish PM, President Congratulate 
Russian Counterparts for National Day: Report”, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com 
/turkish-pm-president-congratulate-russian-counterparts-for-national-day-report.aspx? 
pageID=238&nID=100473&NewsCatID=510, accessed on June 16, 2016. See also 
Cristian Unteanu, “Ce nu ştiu ai noştri: se resetează jocurile în Marea Neagră!”, 
http://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/ce-nu-stiu-nostri-sereseteaza-jocurile-marea-neagra-
1_576503895ab6550cb80fc7e7/index.html, 18 June 2016. 
8
  Ibidem. 
9
  “Erdogan travels to Russia to reset relations”, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/ 2016/08/ 
erdogan-travels-russia-reset-relations-160809032238975.html, accessed on September 10, 
2016. 
10
  “Putin’s War on the West”, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21643189-ukraine-
suffers-it-time-recognise-gravity-russian-threatand-counter, accessed on 14 February 
2015. 
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Soviet states were presented by Russia’s propaganda as Western (US)-backed 
subversion against Moscow’s sphere of influence.  
One could analyse the security environment using the main dyadic 
rivalries: Russia vs Ukraine, Russia vs Turkey, plus the secondary ones: Russia 
vs Georgia, Azerbaijan vs Armenia, Turkey vs Armenia. There is a security 
competition between Russia and NATO also in the WBSA. Alliances, defence 
pacts, and dyadic rivalries theoretically indicate the biggest likelihood of an 
open conflict in the future.  
 
 
Status quo, Revisionism and Deterrence Strategies 
 
One basic question is: which are the status quo powers and which are 
the revisionist ones? There are theories stating that Russia is a status quo power 
at the global level and a revisionist one at the regional level11. This is not really 
true. At the systemic level, Russia seeks China partnership to change the world 
and put an end to US power preponderence (the so called “unipolarity”), to the 
political liberal and democratic system. Some authors states that there is a 
Russian obsession with changing the systemic polarity, more than it is with 
stopping the western-led human rights propaganda and the democracy 
promotion via the coloured revolutions12. Putin and its close counselors seems 
afraid that the West uses democratic ideology and sponsored movements to 
promote regime change in the “buffer” area of the Black Sea, then will try to 
force a regime change in Russia itself. So, no wonder that Moscow constantly 
asks Beijing to challenge the US supremacy and change the status quo from 
unipolarity to multipolarity13. When in June 2008, former Russian president and 
current prime minister D. Medvedev proposed a new European security 
architecture, “from Vancouver to Vladivostok”, based on a new Helsinki-like 
treaty, most of the European states rejected it as they thought Russia wanted to 
control all the European security organizations while not giving up its bad 
practices demonstrated by the 2008 war with Georgia. Why accept a new 
OSCE-like entity when Russia did not respect the basic rule that the European 
borders are inviolable and military force is not a legitimate tool to change them? 
After the annexation of Crimea and the obvious lack of respect for the Helsinki 
                                                 
11
  See the debate in Gleb Pavlovsky, “How the West Misunderstands Russia”, in Ivan 
Krastev, Mark Leonard, Andrew Wilson (eds), What Does Russia Think?, The European 
Council on Foreign Relations, London, 2009, pp. 73-85. 
12
  Timofey Bordachev, “Multipolarity, Anarchy and Security”, in Ivan Krastev, Mark 
Leonard, Andrew Wilson (eds), What Does Russia Think?, cit., pp. 61-66. 
13
  Joseph Nye Jr, S-a sfârșit oare secolul Americii?, transl. by Ondine Dăscăliţa, 
Ed. Comunicare.ro, Bucuresti, 2016, p. 50. Original title – Is the American Century 
Over?, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2015. 
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Final Act, it is certain that in the Black Sea area Russian Federation is a 
revisionist power. Since the second half of the 2000s the Russian revisionism 
towards the post-Soviet states intensified14, while the attempt to split the EU is 
also a revisionist activity. Only in the Barents Sea, on the border with China and 
in its conflictual relations with Japan ‒ for the fate of Kurile Islands in the 
Pacific Ocean ‒ is Moscow a status quo player. Russia tries to make neutral 
Finland and Sweden not to adhere to NATO by using threats and intimidation 
instead of using soft power and incentives15. So, it acts for the status quo but 
with coercive means.  
Deterring Russia from further agression means estimating first its 
power and resolve. Measuring power is not an easy task. It requires putting 
together the size of territory and population, amount of resources, human 
capital, armed forces, industry, agriculture, but also soft power sources like 
ideology and cultural patterns. Russia has an economy worthing about 1,8 
trillion by year (the GDP was about 1860.60 billion US dollars in 2014)16, 
compared with 3,3 trillion USD for Germany and 2,4 trillion for France. Two 
thirds of Russian exports are made up of oil and gas, meaning 20% of the GDP 
and 50% of the state’s revenues17.  
Russian economy is bigger than that of each other Black Sea state. It 
spent 51,6 billion USD for defence in 2015 (4,1% of the GDP), while Turkey 
spent under 10 billion, according to London based International Institute for 
Strategic Studies18. But Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) gave Russia 66,4 billion USD, meaning 5,4% of the GDP and an 91% 
increase comparing with the year 200619. In 2015 Moscow was forced to cut 
budgetary spendings, including 3% for defence, and in 2016 the reduction for 
military spending is about 5%. The elections of September 18, 2016, showed 
the strong popular support for V. Putin, whose United Russia party won about 
                                                 
14
  Ingmar Oldberg, “Is Russia a status quo Power?”, Swedish Institute of International 
Affairs, No. 1/2016, http://www.ui.se/eng/upl/files/126932.pdf, accessed on May 26, 
2016. See p. 14. He stated that “To conclude, Russian foreign policy in most of the 
regions under review has become mainly revisionist, posing a challenge especially to the 
surrounding states” (p. 15).  
15
  Ibidem, p. 15.  
16
  See the statistics offered by Joseph Nye Jr, S-a sfârșit oare secolul Americii?, cit., p. 48. 
The author gave the figure 2,5 trillion USD but specialized economic sites mention a 
figure between 1860 and 2000 billion USD. See “Russia GDP (1989-2016)”,  
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/russia/gdp, accessed on June 7, 2016.  
17
  Joseph Nye Jr, S-a sfârșit oare secolul Americii?, cit., p. 48.  
18
  The Military Balance 2015, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, 
London, 2015.  
19
  “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2015” (PDF). Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute. Retrieved 5 April 2016, http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/  SIPRIFS 
1604.pdf, p. 2. 
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54% of the votes, and the other satellites parties 33%, crushing the real pro-
democracy opposition. 
With 87,2 billion USD allocated for defense (13% of the GDP)20, Saudi 
Arabia for the first time overpassed Russia in 2015 and the trend continues in 
2016. Thus, with a military expense of about 5% of the GDP one can see that 
the sum spent by Russia on defence is bigger than that of UK (55,5 billion 
USD) or Germany (39,4 billion USD)21. 
  
Table 1 
The World Biggest Defense Spenders22 
Country  Spending 
2015 (bil. 
USD) 
World share % Spending as 
share of GDP 
2015 
Spending as share 
of GDP 2016 
(estimation) 
USA 596  36 3,3 3,8 
China 215 13 1,9 2,0 
Saudi Arabia 87,2 5,2 13,7 7,8 
Russia 66.4 4,0 5,4 3,5 
UK 55,5 3,3 2,0 2,2 
 
Russia produces itself most of its military basic equipment and is one of 
the two biggest world exporters, almost on equal foot with the USA, but for 
advanced electronic techology it depends on imports from Western states like 
France, Germany, UK. Now the economic sanctions/embargo let Moscow in a 
limbo. The failure of the Mistral aquisition from France was a big blow for the 
Russian military, added to the fact that Ukraine ceased to produce important 
military equipment for Russian tanks and helicopters. The big Antonov planes-
producer stop its cooperation with Russian firms but was forced to halt the 
aircraft production as it lacked foreign market to sell them. 
On the other side, Turkey, since the middle of the 80’s (previous 
century), began an ambitious program to develop a modern defence industry 
and engage in cooperative agreements with other NATO states such as USA and 
Germany. An example: Turkish frigates were build in cooperation with 
Germany using the MEKO 200 Frigate program, which helped it develop 
modern anti-submarine, anti-air, and anti-surface ship capabilities23. Ankara 
even tried to import technology from China for its missile systems.  
                                                 
20
  http://www.economist.com/news/economic-and-financial-indicators/21692877-defence-
budgets, accessed on May 17, 2016. 
21
  Julien Lindley French, “Russia Parades its Weakness”, http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.ro/, 
published on 11 May 2016.  
22
  Draw from the table given by SIPRI: http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1604.pdf, 
accessed on September 20, 2016. 
23
  “Turkey Domestic Arms Industry”, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/ 
tu-industry.htm, accesed on May 12, 2016.  
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Ukraine, the country which suffered the recent covert Russian invasion 
and lost the territory of Crimea, because of which NATO states bolstered their 
defense, has a military budget of 4 billion USD in 2016 (113 billion Hrivnas, 
that is 5% of the GDP), an increase of 1,6 billion compared with the previous 
year when it was 3,6 billion USD24. Since 2006, Ukraine’s military spending 
rouse by 61% and compared with 2013 the increase was 31%25. The explanation 
is that the former Iuschenko and Yanucovich regimes had largely ignored this 
necessary action. But its national economy is in recession and needs bailout 
funds from foreign institutions like IMF and WB. In September 2016, the IMF 
allowed Ukraine to receive one billion USD.  
While Russia hardly maintains the current defence budget, USA 
decided in February 2016 to allocate 3,4 billion USD for the defense of 
European allies, and, as president Obama stated, “that is why my 
Administration has announced a fourfold increase in the funding of the 
European initiative identity defense support for the continent at the 2017 fiscal 
year”. The NATO three Black Sea states will also benefit from this fund. 
Romania and Bulgaria decided to increase their defense expenditures to comply 
with NATO requirements. Romania in 2015 increased this level by 11% to 2,5 
billion USD and by 2017 it will reach 2% of the GDP. Globally, Central-
European states increased by 13% their defence expenses in 2015 and the trend 
continues26. In the Caucasus area, because its long-lasting conflict with 
Armenia, “Azerbaijan increased its arms imports by 217 per cent between 
2006–10 and 2011–15”27. 
Concerning the military power distribution in the WBSA, the rankings 
seem obvious and difficult to change on the short term. On paper, Russia has 
the second largest land armed forces in the world after P.R. China, with an 
active military and civilian personnel of about 766.000 people (and available 
manpower of about 70 million)28, followed in the Black Sea region by Turkey 
which has the second largest standing military force in NATO, only after the 
U.S. Armed Forces, with an estimated strength of 639.551 military, civilian and 
paramilitary personnel in 2015 (roughly a million with the reserves). According 
to SIPRI, its defence budget in 2015 was 41.546 billion Lira, that is 12.870 
                                                 
24
  “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2015” (PDF). Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute quoted by http://www.ibtimes.com/ukraine-military-defense-budget-
seeks-4b-2016-help-fight-east-ukraine-war-2077291, accesed on May 20, 2016.  
25
  http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=196612, accessed on May 20, 
2016. 
26
  Ibidem.  
27
  http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2016/at-feb-2016, accessed on May 20, 2016.  
28
  “Russia Military Strength”, http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-
detail.asp?country_id=russia, accesed on May 12, 2016.  
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billion Euro, a small increase from the previous year when the spending was 
about 38.891 Lira29.  
The big difference is that Ankara is part of the strongest military 
alliance in the world, NATO, while Russia, one of the two strongest nuclear 
states, is supported by the comparatively small Collective Security Treaty 
Organization, a defense structure in which Moscow is by far the leading power. 
Also this structure, which was based on the former Tashkent Treaty, has been 
weakened by the fact that some former Soviet countries refused the membership 
or accepted it but later exited – Ukraine (never a member), Moldova (never a 
member), Georgia (exit), also Uzbekistan (exit). It is obvious that Armenia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are extremely junior partners 
for Russia and do not really increase its military power capabilities, only the 
access to natural resources.  
One should remember that Moscow was not able to convince even its 
closest ally, Belarus, to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as sovereign 
states. After Crimea was annexed by Russia, only Armenia (through its 
president Serzh Sarkisian) immediately recognized this fact30, while Belarus and 
other CSTO states avoided making explicit statements on this topic and 
insisting only on the need to preserve Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Thus, the 
CSTO could not be seen as a really united and coherent block of states. 
Excepting Russia who controls the rules of the game, the other members are 
there to benefit from money, resources and protection from their big neighbour, 
but they do not fully subordinates their national interests to those of Moscow.  
The countries of the South Caucasus and Black Sea have to decide 
between choosing economic integration with EU via Association Agreements 
plus DCFTAs or preferring Russia’s led Custom Union (Russia, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan) and Eurasian Economic Union (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kirghizstan, Armenia). Moscow, in spite of its hard power and coercive 
diplomacy, in spite of using natural gas as a strategic asset, was not able to 
prevent Ukraine and Moldova from signing association agreements and Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Area pacts (DCFTA) with the EU. Kyiv and 
Chișinău aim at greatly reducing their dependence on Russian gas and Russian 
market, while Moscow also restricted their access to its market as a punishment 
for preferring the EU association.  
 
 
                                                 
29
  SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/ 
milex/milex_database (see the Expenditures for NATO members 1949-2015) 
30
  Ukraine Recalls Ambassador to Armenia over Crimea Recognition, http://asbarez.com/ 
120951/ukraine-recalls-ambassador-to-armenia-over-crimea-recognition/, published on 
March 21, 2014.  
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Defence Investments, Demographics 
and (Not So) Healty Economics 
 
Meanwhile, Russia, even if forced to diminish the money for the armed 
forces in 2016 with about 5%, still extracts more money for defence than each 
big European western state taken separately, in spite of its crumbling economy. 
In 2016 the defence budget reduction is logical since the oil price remains the 
same and the sanctions in place. Russian economy is smaller than that of 
France, UK or Germany and now tends to become more inward-oriented. The 
obvious explanation is that Russian leadership, especially president Putin, 
managed to solve the butter vs. guns dilemma by clearly favoring defence and 
sacrifying the needs of the population. Putin’s calculus is that the Russians like 
him so much and are so nationalistic/patriotic that they will accept this sacrifice 
for years to come. But the future will not be so easy to determine, not so linear 
and previsible. Foreign investors are not attracted by Russian economy after the 
sanctions were establised and maintained for more than two years. The Russian 
Ruble lost at least 50% of its value, compared with the US dollar and the Euro, 
since 2014 mainly because of the economic sanctions and decline of world oil 
price, thus the planned defence spendings will be reduced for a longer period. 
Moscow announced some years ago its intention to spend about 700 billion 
USD for a period of 10 years to catch with the more advanced NATO states 
(and implicitely with China’s spectacular progress), about 23 trillion Rubles by 
2020, but it is likely that the spending will be at a maximum level of 400 billion 
USD for the same period, if Putin does not want to risk huge popular 
protests. The Russian economy diminished by 3,7% in 201531 and will 
probably loss 1-2% this year.  
The embargo is erroding the basis of ordinary Russians’ living standard. 
Since the relations with Turkey broke in November 2015, Moscow had decided 
not to take agricultural food from this country, thus being forced to buy it from 
Africa and Latin America, in direct competition with states such as China and 
India. Of course, the August 2016 deal between Erdogan and Putin allowed 
Russians to buy again Turkish food products. Russian economy was also hit by 
downgrading by biggest “ratings and rankings organizations (RROs)”: in 2015 
Standard&Poor and Moody’s downgraded the country below investment grade 
after western capitals began to depart as consequence of Crimea’s annexation 
and downing of oil price, plus legislative changes by the Russian government. 
On March 17, 2016, “Moody’s ratings agency announced Friday it has officially 
                                                 
31
  “Russia Will Cut Defense Budget by 5 Percent in 2016”, RIA reports, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-defense-budget-idUSKCN0W80TL, retrieved on 
May 5, 2016. 
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stopped issuing local credit ratings for Russian companies”32. These agencies 
are US-based but they have big international credibility, so their decision 
affected Russian economy. Russia has a poor position on many global ranking: 
human development, quality of life, freedom and democracy, business, 
environment, economic freedom, civil society. It has also been expelled from 
G7 after Crimea’s annexation. Over the last decade, president Putin has openly 
criticized the ranking agencies, especially western-based Freedom House, 
calling them American pawns which interfere in Russian sovereignty33. This did 
not prevent these agencies from doing very negative reports on Russian 
performances, a fact which also diminished its soft power at least from the 
western point of view. On 7 May 2012, after his re-election, Putin stated that he 
wants to make Russian economy a modern one, taking it from its position as 
120th on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index (DBI) to 50th by the 
year 201534. Of course, he failed and never recognized that. Annexing Crimea 
and supporting a civil war in Ukraine was very detrimental to this goal. The 
“Partnership for Modernization” between Russia and the EU, launched in June 
2010, did not produce benefits for Russian economy and society because 
Moscow was reluctant to agree with the needed reforms.  
The likelihood that the price of oil barrel would soon increase over the 
50 USD which is the minimum level where Russia could have a small profit is 
low for the next three years, since the Gulf states have the interest to increase 
the global output and Moscow did not manage to convince OPEC states to 
reduce their production, during the Doha negotiations on April 18, 2016. Ryad 
asked Moscow to determine Iran to limit its huge exportations of oil but that 
was not possible, since Russia does not have such a leverage on Tehran which, 
escaping the western embargo, is eager to get more cash. In January 2016, Saudi 
Arabia produced about 10.2 million barrels per say, the highest level since 
1981, while Russia produced 10,88 million barrels a day, also a record level. 
Economic factors prevented a global deal on freezing oil production and Russia, 
which is not an OPEC country, did not have enough leverage to push towards 
such a positive result35.  
NATO member Turkey has a GDP of about 717 billion USD in 2015, 
less than in 2011 – 772. Its decline is much more supportable than Russia’s one 
because its economy is a modernizing one. If Russia will at some moment close 
                                                 
32
  “Moody’s Withdraws Domestic Ratings in Russia”, https://www.rt.com/business/336086-
moodys-russia-local-ratings/, 18 March 2016.   
33
  Alexander Cooley, Jack Snyder, Ranking the World, Cambridge University Press, UK, 
2015, p. 8. 
34
  Ibidem, p. 1. 
35
  Anjli Raval, David Sheppard, “Oil Price Tumbles on Doha Deal Stalemate”, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7584b5e4-045c-11e6-a70d-4e39ac32c284.html#axzz48RF0aBvc, 
published on April 18, 2016.  
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the Blue Stream gas pipelines it will severely impact both their economies, so 
the likelihood of such a development is small, since China is not ready to absorb 
the Russian available gas via the Power of Siberia pipeline (Yakutia–
Khabarovsk–Vladivostok pipeline), under construction.  
In the demographic realm, Russia keeps slowly declining36 (it lost 5 
million people in 25 years) while Turkey has an small increase in population 
each year, about 1,2 – 1,7% (between 2011 and 2015 the population rose from 
74,2 to 77,7 million)37. Smaller Azerbaijan benefits from high fertility rates and 
some analysts forecasted that in 2030, the population of Azerbaijan will reach 
10.7 million, which means an increase of 11.9% from 201538. Neighboring 
Armenia’s population will probably increased by 10.973 people and reach 
3.033.839 in the beginning of 201739. EU-members Romania and Bulgaria 
experience a slow population decline and are wary of not artificially increasing 
the populations through massive immigration from Africa and Middle East. 
Ukraine had a slow decline in population in 2015, with negative natural increase 
and the number of deaths was bigger than that of births by 192 479. Of course, 
it had also lost 2 million people from Crimea, in the benefit of Russia. Ukraine 
is still a country at war. In 2016, “Ukraine population is projected to decreased 
by -155.127 people and reach 42 462 218 in the beginning of 201740. Finally, 
Rep. of Moldova and Georgia suffer from depopulation and aging process 
(declining birth rate), increased by the huge migration to EU states41. 
 
                                                 
36
   Joseph Chamie, Barry Mirkin, Russian Demographics: The Perfect Storm, 2014, 
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/russian-demographics-perfect-storm, accesed on May 2, 
2016. “High rates of smoking, alcohol consumption, drug use, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
obesity, heart disease, violence, suicide and environmental pollution contribute to 
Russians’ poor health. Russia’s current male life expectancy at birth of 64 years is 15 
years lower than male life expectancies in Germany, Italy and Sweden.”…“ if fertility 
remained essentially constant, not an unreasonable assumption, the Russian population 
would fall to around 111 million by mid-century and 67 million by 2100. Such an 
outcome would mean that the Russian population would be less than half of its current 
size by the close of the 21st century.” 
37
  http://www.indexmundi.com/turkey/demographics_profile.html, accesed on May 12, 
2016. See also http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/turkey-population/, 
accesed on 12 May 2016. For Turkey’s situation see http://www.focus-economics.com 
/countries/turkey, accessed on June 14, 2016.  
38
  Azerbaijan in 2030: The Future Demographic, http://www.euromonitor.com/azerbaijan-
in-2030-the-future-demographic/report, accessed on July 20, 2015. 
39
  Armenia, http://countrymeters.info/en/Armenia, accessed on May 20, 2016. 
40
  Ukraine population clock, http://countrymeters.info/en/Ukraine, accesed on May 12, 
2016. 
41
  Georgia demographic Profile 2014, http://www.indexmundi.com/georgia/demographics_ 
profile.html. Concerning the situation in the Rep. of Moldova see Situația demografică în 
Rep. Moldova 2014, http://www.statistica.md/newsview.php?l=ro&idc=168&id=4787, 
accesed on May 10 2016.  
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Power: Reality and Perception 
 
Above all it is important how power is perceived by other actors, how 
the others assess the resove of the Black Sea countries? Does Russia think that 
NATO will move to defend its three Balck Sea members? Do the NATO states 
think that Russia could do an aggression and that it must be deterred? At what 
price? Power alone is not enough to correctly predict the behaviour of states. 
Other factors must be taken into account. One important element is resilience: if 
a state is under attack, if he is economically hit and strategically encircled will it 
be apt to survive alone? The elements which allow assesing intentions are at the 
state level – the capabilities, the interests, the alliances and the regyme type, and 
at the leader level – the gender, the experience, the personality and the “time in 
office”42. A state which highly vales the prestige and wants to signal its huge 
resolve will be more willing to pay the costs of fighting and suffering retaliation 
than a normal state.  
A good example is Turkey whose military decision-makers in 2015 
decided to down a Russian Suhoi jet entering its air space, while other NATO 
states like UK, Norway, Romania prefered to avoid such actions fearing a 
Russian harsh reaction. For nine months, Turkey payed a big economic price 
after Russia broke up a lot of economic ties with Ankara. Russian leaders 
perceive NATO states as being weakened by their democratic regime, with 
sometimes different national agendas and with the alliance as a whole obliged to 
take the lesser common denominator in many crisis situation to avoid members 
using their veto in the North Atlantic Council (NAC). They perceive the leaders 
of European states as being either unexperienced (Poland and Romania have 
presidents in their first mandates) or under heavy pressures by countries such as 
Germany, which is seen in Moscow as an indispensable economic partner and 
dependent on Russian gas. Or they see the public opinions putting strong 
pressures on the decsion-makers to avoid confronting Russia, like is the case in 
NATO-countries Czech Republik, Slovakia, Greece etc. Even the German 
ruling coalition is divided between those who want Russian sanction to be 
maintained (ex: Angela Merkel) and those who are in favor of relaxing and then 
aboloshing them (Sigmar Gabriel, the Economy Minister).  
In case of a an EU big structural failure, it is likely that Russian leader 
anticipates Germany as willing to seek bandwagoning with Russia even against 
the USA43. Russia counts on the radical leaders of populist and nationalist 
parties such as Jobbik (Hungary), Front National (France) or Alternative for 
                                                 
42
  Joshua Kertzer, Jonathan Renshon, Keren Yarhi Milo, “How do Observers assess 
Resolve?”, http://people.fas.harvard.edu/~jkertzer/Research_files/KertzerRenshonYarhi-
Milo021415.pdf, 18 March 2015, p. 4. 
43
  George Friedman, Puncte de presiune, transl. by Corina Hădăreanu, Editura Litera, 
Bucureşti, 2016, p. 241. 
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Germany (AFD) which received money or political support from Moscow and 
thus are Russian interests supportive44. In the Black Sea states, the Russian 
penetration of political class, economy and intelligence structures seems very 
serious in the former Soviet area. This could help Moscow use hybrid warfare 
tactics also in the future. But Russian lobbies certainly exists and are strong in 
the economies of Bulgaria, Hungary, Serbia, and even Romania. These 
economic bussiness networks probably have strong connections with Russian 
intelligence agencies. On the other side, Germany is not ready to give up the 
building of another Nord Stream gas pipeline (N.S.2) and to reduce the size of 
Russian lobby in its economy. 
Moscow was amazed by the multiple and serious crises that the EU is 
confronted with (Euro crisis, Greece’s economic quasi-collapse, immigration, 
Brexit, terrorism, territorial revisionism, emergence of nationalist-populist and 
anti-integration strong movements) and decided to use them in its benefit. 
Russia is not an EU state, it does not aim at being one, they compete for the 
“buffer” area of the Black Sea region former soviet states, thus the idea that EU 
could soon desintegrate is not something that makes Moscow anxious. On the 
contrary, Russia would prefer to deal separately with all the rich and big 
European states. Historian Timothy Snyder (Yale University) stated that Putin’s 
Russia wanted the desintegration of the EU and separation of European nations. 
Each nation should be led by a strong leader, similar to fascist rulers of the 
past45. This could be seen as a punishment for not recognizing Russia as a great 
power, again and to recognize its sphere of influence, in a unanimous way. He 
mention the fact that V. Putin is fascinated by White Russian philosopher Ivan 
Ilyin (1883-1954) who was seduced by Hitler and Mussolini, an anti-communist 
thinker who believed that Russia always fought wars in self-defence “against 
encirclement by Europe” and that its historic “soul” survived through Orthodox 
Christendom and strong rulers46. Eurasianism, fascist-like ideas, the cult of 
strong leaders, the organicism and anti-liberalism could be the main doctrinary 
elements of the Russian regime whose main liability is the fact it does not have 
a clear principle for the succession of leadership47.  
Thus, the fact that Putin’ Russia financed and supported nationalist and 
radical political forces in EU states, taking advantage of western democracy 
tolerance towards foreign interferences, may be seen according to such a theory 
                                                 
44
  Melanie Amann, Pavel Lokshin, “German Populists Forge Ties with Russia”, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-populists-forge-deeper-ties-with-
russia-a-1089562.html, accessed on 27 April 2016. 
45
  Timothy Snyder, “Ukraine and Russia in a Fracturing Europe”, https://www.youtube.com 
/watch?v=dfduV68C1Jk&feature=youtu.be. 
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  See Alexandra Wiktorek Sarlo, “Russian Foreign Policy in the Putin Era: A Conference 
Report”, http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/05/russian-foreign-policy-putin-era/, May 2016.   
47
  Anton Barbashin, Hannah Thoburn, “Putin's Philosopher”, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ 
articles/russian-federation/2015-09-20/putins-philosopher, accessed on May 2, 2016.  
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as a logical step for dislodging the EU and supporting the emergence of strong 
nationalist leaders in Western states. But domestically, all NGOs with foreign 
finance were banned by the Putin regime. At the same time, we think no 
NATO/EU responsible leader really envisages playing a symetrical game 
against Russia, that is by supporting separtist Chechens and other Muslims 
guerillas/terrorists in Southern Russia, not only for fear of Russian strong 
retaliation but especially since a Russian state collapse and rise of radical Islam 
would be seen as a worse scenario that current Putin’s Russia. Who would be 
ready to send tens of thousands of peace-keepers to separate rival forces there, 
in a tremendoulsy huge territory if the state collapses? Who is ready for peace-
enforcement on the territory of a state which has the veto power in the UNSC? 
Or accept that China could end by controling the Primorsky Krai territory? The 
US already did that in Afghanistan against the USSR in the '80s and we all 
know the story of Bin Ladern and Al Qaida... But would it perhaps be legitimate 
to threaten Russia with such a scenario in case it still supports extreme right 
forces in EU states? In this case, the threat must be credible and proportional to 
the grief, of course. 
One cannot say that professor Snyder is certainly right. But nowadays 
Putin’s Russia is a most revisionist power in the Black Sea and in the Europe: 
taking Crimea (and extending Russian 200 miles Economic Exclusive Zone in 
Northern Black Sea area, while reducing at half the Ukrainian coastline)48, 
destabilizing Ukraine in the East, possibly preparing for absorbing South 
Ossetia but pressuring Turkey to keep the Montreux statute unchanged. 
Moscow also helps radical populist and nationalist forces win power againt 
democratic leaders in the EU but no one, except Putin’s close advisers, knows 
the real extend of this support. On the other side, Moscow is a status quo power 
in the Middle East, and this explains its support for the Assad regime in Syria. 
President Putin is the opposite of Tsar Nicolas I which helped crush national-
liberal rebellions in central-western Europe but in the Balkans fought agains the 
Ottomans by assuming the role of an Orthodox crusader and Greek nation’s 
liberator after 1825. Both may be seen as genuine Russian nationalists. Putin 
believes it has a moral obligation to help brethren Orthodox Russians from 
Ukraine just like Tsar Nikolas I thought he had a moral obligation towards 
Orthodox Greeks. They both used Russian hard power and constantly threaten 
their targets – Ukraine and the Turkish Empire. In my opinion, Russia likes to 
be seen as a threatening power, to agitate its hard power capabilities in order to 
provoke submission and bandwagon effects, it likes to be feared by smaller 
neighbors and force them to stay in its sphere of influence. It seems delighted to 
be considered by US leaders and planning factors as an almost un-deterrable 
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and not so rational actor, which could use even the nuclear assets to defend its 
vital interests.  
One useful instrument to use for establishing connections between 
V. Putin’s beliefs and his actions, present and future ones, is the “operational 
code”, a paradigm of the Foreign Policy Analysis. Framed by Nathan Leites and 
Alexander George49, the o.c. presents the main ideas and beliefs of a leader 
about the world, the adversary and the friends/allies and allows some possibility 
to predict his future behavior. The core of a leader’s beliefs generally stays 
unchanged during his life but some peripheral elements could change in time, as 
the leader learns lessons from the events and from the entourage. His main 
beliefs concerning the West which is seen as engaged in a zero-sum competition 
with Russia and tries to reduce its sphere of influence and even provoke regime 
change, remained constant between 2014-2016, but in spite of this, some 
flexibility in foreign policy was seen, as a proof that he may accept some kind 
of compromise in the end, if this compromise do not oblige him to trade off 
national values and expectations50.  
Moscow harshly criticizes US-build anti-missile shield but for a long 
time, since the USSR time, it relied on such a system on its territory in order to 
keep equilibrium in the offence-defence balance51. When invited by NATO 
states to contribute to NATO shield, Moscow asked a veto-right, knowing that 
the allied states could not accept such a thing and especially the US Congress 
did not allow for granting special guarantees to Russia that the shield will not be 
used against it. In the end, Russia decided in 2012 to invest in its own “shield”, 
to upgrade the old A 135 Amur by the new A-235, which will be mobile and 
rely on conventional high-explosive and kinetic-energy warheads, not on 
nuclear missiles52. And NATO states, contrary to Moscow, did not protest 
against this plan. 
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  A. George, “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political 
Leaders and Decision-Making”, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 2, Jun. 1969, 
pp. 190-222. 
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  Jyri Joonas Lavikainen, “The Operational Code of Vladimir Putin in the Ukrainian Crisis 
in 2014”, https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/163809/Lavikainen_poliittinen 
%20historia.pdf, May 2016.  
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  Valentin Naumescu, “Scutul antirachetă, Rusia şi ordinea europeană. O tensiune 
insolubilă?”, http://www.contributors.ro/global-europa/scutul-antiracheta-rusia-si-ordinea-
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52
  According to experts, the new Russian missile system will use multiple types of  missiles: 
“The A-235 will have missiles capable of operating at three different ranges: long-range, 
based on the 51T6 and capable of destroying targets at distances up to 1500 km (930 
miles), at altitudes up to 800.000 m; medium-range, an update of the 58R6, designed to 
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As some analysts remarked, after the big success of the 1815 Vienna 
Congress, Russia proved unable to peacefully integrate the European and later 
Euro-Atlantic Westphalian system of states and also unable to accept liberal 
orders guaranteed by the concert of powers53. It was unable to accept being an 
equal among the pairs. To distance itself more from the West, Russian leaders 
invoked different cultural models (the communism one, the Eurasianist doctrine 
etc.) and different political models (totalitarianism, followed by illiberal or 
“sovereign” democracy). Thus, its hard power tends to be seen as a threat by the 
western liberal states, in spite of lucrative energy deals with some of them – 
Germany, Hungary etc. Many western experts see Russia as a military great 
power but a weak economy and a decadent society. At the same time, Russian 
pro-government analysts tend to depict the West as decadent and weak, having 
lost the direction and the loyalty of its populations. As Sergei Karaganov stated, 
the West is a “directionless gaggle, beset with economic insecurities and losing 
sight of its moral convictions”54. 
  
 
Security Dilemmas and the Main Risks 
 
Geographically speaking, there are some classical dyadic rivalries in the 
area, and the current changes in the power structures could lead to security 
dilemma mechanisms since the challangers would prefer to risk and the 
dominant power to strike back. 
Of course, Russia knows that NATO is commited to defend the western 
and southern shore of the Black Sea. Together, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania 
have enough small and medium-sized military boats and submarines to surpass 
Russia, which is superior only in missiles, tanks and in huge military vessels. 
But decision-makers in Moscow seem to count on the idea that Russia is still 
able to create internal divisions/splits within NATO, to speculate some lack of 
coordination and intra-alliance rivalries or difficult burder-sharing to prevent 
greater allied cohesion. Moscow managed to convince Paris and London in 
2008 to block Ukraine’ and Georgia’s bid for NATO’s MAP, but nor could it 
                                                                                                                       
hit targets at distances up to 1000 km (620 miles), at altitudes up to 120.000 m; and short-
range (the 53T6M or 45T6 [based on the 53T6]), with an operating range of 350 km (215 
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The Financial Times, 14 September 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/05770494-
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anticipate that the EU would be so intransigent on Ukraine and neither its 
insistence on the Association Agreement signature with Kiev and Chișinău55.  
By using its natural energy stimuli and providing cheap gas, 
investments in nuclear energy, by threatening some member states, Russia 
expects NATO/EU members to be victims of the phenomenon of 
“underbalancing”. A decade ago, neorealist thinker Randall Schweller explained 
this phenomenon which occurs when “a state does not balance or does so 
inefficiently in response to a dangerous and unappeasable aggressor, and the 
state’s efforts are essential to deter or defeat it”56. Examples: Moscow 
capitalizes on Germany’s need for gas, on Hungary’s need for nuclear energy 
and gas, and on Czech and Slovak reluctance to be involved in managing 
Ukraine’s crisis and accept NATO bases on their territories. Underbalancing, 
according to Schweller, is based on domestic policies’ sensitive issues: lack of 
elite consensus, fragmentation of the societies, societal tensions and regime’s 
instability57. 
All Black Sea states must openly deal with the risks of underbalancing 
but at the same time this is not a reason for suppressing democratic rules and 
preferring “illiberal democracies”. Turkey, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia have 
domestic ethno-religious and societal-political cleavages which diminish their 
capacity to act as strong and coherent actors in their strategic game with Russia. 
Looking more in detail, Ankara is again in a law intensity war against the PKK 
forces, while also facing bloody Daesh terrorist attacks and having send military 
forces in Northern Syria to help local militias against Daesh and the Kurds, its 
political class is divided by president Erdogan’s attempt to change the 
constitutional regime and to be very repressive towards the opposition; Ukraine 
is confronted with Russian separatism in the East and lack of cohesion among 
the political class concerning the future of the country and the issue of 
federalism and implementing the Minsk II stipulations; Georgia and Moldova 
are divided between pro-western and pro-Eurasian adepts and weakened by 
their long-lasting frozen conflicts and turbulent ethnic minorities. Romania and 
Bulgaria seem more stable and in a better economic shape, but they do not lack 
some political and societal tensions (like the ethnic militantism of Hungarians, 
Szeklers, Turks) and also uncertainty about the EU’s future and migration 
issues. The NATO Warsaw summit (July 2016) showed declarative 
cohesiveness among allies, promises to send 4 multinational battalions on the 
Eastern flank, but at the same time the Bulgarian government opposed a 
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Turkish-Romanian proposal to create a Black Sea NATO flotilla, as the 
Bulgarian prime minister did not want to provoke Russian ire and Sophia had 
tensed relations with Ankara over the immigrants readmission process. 
Using its hybrid warfare tactics, Russia will likely continue to use these 
aspects to diminish the effectiveness of NATO in case of crisis. This goes in the 
same direction with the strategic effects of underbalancing. Moscow knows that 
in military and economic fields NATO as a whole is clearly superior, with the 
USA alone clearly overpassing Russia, on the long term. Estimating capabilities 
is not a difficult task but assesing the resolve is a much more difficult one. 
Capabilities, intentions and resolve are the three main elements that Russia and 
the NATO-Black Sea states try to assess in order to predict their strategic 
behaviour. NATO needs to use a stick and carrot strategy towards Russia but 
the coercive diplomacy should be based on commitment and deterrence, also on 
assurance. 
Russia sees NATO’s resistance as an axis connecting the Black Sea, the 
Baltic Sea and the North Sea but one made up of heterogenous states – some of 
them powerful and with unified elites and populations, other being weaker and 
with internal divisions. It will not dare to attack a member state but will use 
covert and hybrid (non-linear) tactics so as its actions stay under the article 5 
activation threshold. Probably it will try to isolate some NATO members and 
make them accept Russian views and interests by using intimidation, bribes and 
promises. We see that Russia, as an authoriarian state, had an advantage over 
NATO regarding propaganda, desinformation and intimidation-psychological 
warfare58. NATO Strategic Centre of Excellence (StratCom COE) recognized 
some Russian “potential asymetrical advantage over the West”, since Putin’s 
regime is a centralized one and able to carry up an information warfare by 
controliong the mass media without constraints from the public opinion59. The 
West must be able to counter the Russian narratives based on historical 
memory, nationalism, myth of Russian world (based on Russian Slavic 
Orthodox Civilization opposing a decadent and materialist West), Eurasianism, 
militant religion, diasporas, as part of the information warfare. The power 
struggle will be not only a military one but more focused on psychological and 
information skills. The cyber-warfare capabilities and the quality of Special 
Operation Forces will also be important. The Black Sea area cannot escape this 
general pattern.  
It is difficult to deny that when Russia took Crimea it significantly 
improved its power position and projection with the Black Sea. Ideologically, 
                                                 
58
  James K. Wither, “Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare”, Connections, no. 2, 2016, pp. 73-
87, http://connections-qj.org/article/making-sense-hybrid-warfare. See p. 84.  
59
  Ibidem. The authors refers to the following NATO document: “Analysis of Russia’ s 
Information Campaign against Ukraine”, http://www.stratcomcoe.org/analysis-russias-
information-campaign-against-ukraine, accessed on May 20, 2016.  
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Russian leader Putin saw Crimea “as the ancient Korsun or Chersonesus, and 
Sevastopol have invaluable civilisational and even sacral importance for Russia, 
like the Temple Mount in Jerusalem for the followers of Islam and Judaism”60. 
The inheritance of the Byzantine Empire and classical Greece was “saved” from 
the Turks then from the “traitors” Ukrainians. Nationalism and religious images 
were combined to legitimate the regime and make the Russians accept the 
isolation of their country by the West61. 
Crimea brought about 27.000 sqm and 2500 kms of new borders plus about 
1,8 million ethnic Russians. From there, by installing land to sea and sea to land 
missiles (Bastion anti-ship missile systems, coastal defense missile systems 
BAL (SSC-6 Sennight), Club-K cruise missile systems, possibly Iskander 
missiles, also preparing a deployment of Tu-22M3 strategic bomber with Kh-22 
cruise missiles that can fly to 500 km at 4.000 km/h) submarines and huge 
military boats62, Russia is able to deny access to NATO forces into the Black 
Sea in case of a conflict and even force Turkey to carefully respect the 
Montreux Convention or to use a more restrictive approach on this. Moscow 
brought more than 20.000 soldiers in Crimea since 2014. Russian short-range 
missiles from Crimea could hit Romania’s Dobrogea, Bulgaria’s coast and 
Turkish straits but also Istanbul, its biggest city. The possibility that Russia 
would also deploy nuclear warheads should be taken into account. Crimea and 
Kaliningrad are the two powerful military platforms that Russia has on the 
NATO’s flanks. The question is if now, when the missile shield facility “Aegis 
Ashore” from Deveselu has been declared operational, followed by other land-
based interceptors installed in Poland by 2018, when Turkey hosts the radar 
facility, Romania and its NATO neighbors must still accept this strategic 
vulnerability and the possibility that Russia could decide to act pre-emptively 
against these S.M. 3 missiles Block 1B interceptors. Or should they think that 
                                                 
60
  Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly”, December 4, 2014, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47173, accesed on March 3, 2015.  
61
  A. Kolesnikov, “Russian Ideology after Crimea”, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/ 
09/22/russian-ideology-after-crimea/ii3q, 22 September 2015.  
62
  According to Ukrainian sources: “Since the first days of its military aggression in eastern 
Ukraine, Russia has been deliberately ‘stuffing’ the peninsula with personnel and military 
equipment. While at the end of 2013 the Russian Federation had some 14.000 military 
personnel, over 30 warships and vessels moored at leased berths, 20 Su-24M and Su-
24MR and An-26 aircraft and up to a dozen Ka-27 helicopters (based at Kacha and 
Hvardiyske airbases) deployed in the Crimean peninsula, those numbers increased to 
24.500 military personnel, 30 MBTs, 260 armored fighting vehicles, 80 aircraft; 40 
helicopters; 80 cannon artillery systems (both self-propelled and towed); 40 MLRS 
launcher units and 24 S-300 SAM systems as of August 2015, according to data from the 
Information Resistance volunteer group”. See “The Threat from Crimea”, http://defence-
ua.com/index.php/en/publications/defense-express-publications/619-the-threat-from-crimea, 
14 March 2016.  
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the deterrence will perfectly work against Russia in spite of the fact that 
officially NATO anti-missile shield was not designed against Russia’s threat63?  
Moscow plans to quickly develop its Black Sea Fleet by adding 80 new 
ships and other types of vessels by 2020 at a price of about 2,3 billion USD in 
the words of Admiral Chirkov, the Russian navy commander. Between 2017-
2018 the Black Sea fleet will probably receive six Admiral Grigorovich class 
frigates and six new Vershavyanka class submarines (improved Kilo class)64. 
These are area-denial weapons for deterring NATO activities in the Black Sea, 
especially if Romania could convince the other NATO states of the usufulness 
of a Black Sea allied fleet65. Since Russia does not have any more high power 
marine turbines imported from Ukraine, it will be obliged to take them from 
China or build them internally66. In 2014 Russia installed in Crimea Bastion P 
anti-ship missiles systems 
                                                 
63
  In their Warsaw Summit communiqué, on July 9, the NATO leaders agreed to call Russia 
a threat: “Russia's aggressive actions, including provocative military activities in the 
periphery of NATO territory and its demonstrated willingness to attain political goals by 
the threat and use of force, are a source of regional instability, fundamentally challenge 
the Alliance, have damaged Euro-Atlantic security, and threaten our long-standing goal of 
a Europe whole, free, and at peace”. See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ 
official_texts_133169.htm, 9 July 2016.  
64
  O. Manea, G. Vișan, A. Goșu, V. Gusilov, “Black Sea in Access Denial Age”, Romanian 
Energy Centre, ROEC Special Report, January 2016, p. 17 
65
  On June 16, after the meeting of the presidents of Romania and Bulgaria in Sofia, 
who both supported the idea of a NATO Black Sea fleet, the Bulgarian prime 
minister B. Borisov bluntly and unexpectedly rejected that idea and stated that Russia 
would not attack Bulgaria and is not a danger for his country, taking into account the 
cultural and religious linkages. “I want to see sailboats, yachts, tourists, peace and love in 
our Black Sea resorts, I do not want frigates crisscrossing the sea. We can have Bulgarian-
Romanian exercises any time we want, but that other thing would be opting for a military 
conflict”, stated Borissov. (http://www.bta.bg/en/c/DF/id/1358234, accessed on June 16) 
At the same time between June 16-27, 2016, a pan-Orthodox council took place in Crete 
(Greece) under the authority of the Constantinople Patriarch Bartholomeu, with the aim of 
preparing the harmonization and spiritual unity of the orthodox Christian different 
churches. The Russian Patriarch together with the Bulgarian one refused to take part in 
this event. This council was the first such event in 1000 years. The conference initially 
was planned to take place in Istanbul, where is the seat of the Ecumenical Patriarch, but 
Russia asked for Crete because of its political conflict with Turkey. In the end Russian 
patriarch refused to take part in it and showed that synodality is still a battlefield. The 
Bulgarian heads of the orthodox church are heavy influenced by the Russian Patriarch. 
One could see a possible linkage between the two events. Bulgaria has a strong pro-
Russian lobby with economic activities and different threat perceptions than Romania, 
Poland etc. In November 2016 a pro-Russian Socialist, Mr. Rumen Radev, was elected 
president of the republic. See “Bulgarian Orthodox Church withdraws from Pan-Orthodox 
Council in Crete”, http://sofiaglobe.com/2016/06/01/bulgarian-orthodox-church-
withdraws-from-pan-orthodox-council-in-crete/, accessed on June 21, 2016. 
66
  Ibidem, p. 10. 
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On the other side, after its annexation, most of western capitals, technology 
and investments fled from Crimea and let it in a state of poverty. The Western 
sanctions which affects the military, banking and energy sector of Russia will 
expire in July – they could be prolonged or not. They do not aim at weakening 
Russia in order to let it vulnerable to aggression. Their role is to make Moscow 
change its behaviour, to abandon its territorial revisionism. The EU and Russia 
had negotiated since 2008 a strategic partnership but now the negotiations are 
postponed. The lack of such a document increases the uncertainty and lack of 
trust, thus favoring the security dilemma mechanisms. 
The economic sanctions are erroding the basis of ordinary Russians’ 
living standard. They act together with the world decline of oil price and the 
diversification of gas supply via the more frequent use of shale gas. Russian 
economy is no more really attractive for foreign investors and a lot of 
investments left that country after 2014. In 2012, about 75% of foreign 
investments in Russia were from EU states67. Now Russian banks are cut from 
access to western European capital markets and the trade with EU sharpely 
declined. Capital flight from Russia could have been about 250 billion USD in 
2014-2016. Only in 2014 about 151 billion USD left Russia accordiong to 
Russia Central Bank68. The access to western technology has also been 
diminished, one good example being the gas and oil extracting technology were 
Russia depends on foreign partners. Of course some EU states also suffered 
heavy loses because of the Russian embargo on their products. The BRICS 
states alone are not able to immediately compensate Russia for the lost of 
western markets, capitals and technology69. Anyway, Crimea was not such a 
radical departure from what Moscow used to do in that area. The Summer 2008 
war between Russia and Georgia was the fist major change of territorial status 
quo in the Black Sea area, producing two separatist republics recognized only 
by Russia and some second-rate Latino-American states (Venezuela, 
Nicaragua).  
The so-called “Medvedev Doctrine” plays against the sovereignty of 
Russia‘s small neighbors and it is contrary to UN Charter which protects states’ 
sovereignty. This doctrine was formulated by Dmitri Medvedev, the prime 
minister of Russia and former president, and refers to so-called “right” of 
Russia to help Russian minorities abroad, including by using the force to 
                                                 
67
  Elina Kyselchuk, “What Effect Have Sanctions Had so Far?, The Sanctions on Russia”, a 
Report of the Bow Group, August 2015, http://www.bowgroup.org/sites/ bowgroup.uat. 
pleasetest.co.uk/files/Bow%20Group%20-%20Sanctions%20on%20Russia%20-%20 
Adriel%20Kasonta.pdf, pp. 8-9, accessed on May 29, 2016. 
68
  “$110 Billion Expected to Flee Russia This Year as Sanctions Bite”, 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/110-billion-expected-to-flee-russia-
this-year-as-sanctions-bite/522575.html, 28 May 2015. 
69
  Ibidem, pp. 9-10.  
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prevent genocide. The strategy to protect Russian minorities (“diasporas”) 
abroad existed even before the beginning of Putin’s era – Moscow offered its 
diasporas financial incentives, Russian passports and political support against 
their states since the years ’90s. This (in)famous Medvedev doctrine allows 
Russia to use its national power to coerce smaller and weaker states which in 
the past belonged to the USSR. That means that diasporas are and will be used 
by Moscow as an element of national power on the international arena. The 
model already existed. China often used the leverage on its immigration in 
Southern Asia, India recently announced that the Roma population in Europe 
could receive also its citizenship. Russia is using the presence of ethnic 
Russians in the Baltic states to put pressures on these states and on NATO. In 
eastern Ukraine, Moscow used the Russian minority to launch a civil war and 
then keep it alive, also blocking Ukraine’s possible NATO membership. It is 
possible that it would use a local Russian rebellion in a NATO member to see if 
NATO states are able to reach the article 5 consensus within the NAC or not. If 
NATO proves to be decided, Russia could withdraw its support for the local 
rebels and pretend not having any connection with them70. As we mentioned 
before, Medvedev also proposed in 2008 to the West a new European security 
organization based on common decision by consensus and on the respect of 
spheres of interests for all powers. Most of NATO states rejected it because they 
did not trust Russian honesty and the fact that the Alliance’s decision could be 
subject to a Russian veto. But would the acceptance by the West of that 
organization have made Russia give up its doctrine for aggressively supporting 
its ethnic-kin diasporas in neighboring post-Soviet states? Nobody could say for 
sure, but recognizing its great power status, the Black Sea area buffer zone and 
limiting EU/NATO’s capacity to expand to the East might have contributed to a 
diminution of Russia’s territorial revisionism.   
The WBSA security subcomplex is also interlinked with the Midle East 
security subcomplex: Russia and Turkey are rival for more power and influence 
in Sirya and Irak, they support oposing camps accross the Sunni/Shia and 
Arab/Turkoman/Kurd divide, and this multiple rivalry is translated also in the 
Black Sea with Turkey trying to involve NATO allies in its competition against 
Russia. Turkey is more and more closer to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other sunni 
Gulf states, creating together a block to counter Russia wich is a de facto ally of 
                                                 
70
  Douglas Mastriano, “Putin’s Conundrum: The Baltic Region, Unconventional Threats and 
a Rising Russia”, http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/04/putins-conundrum-baltic-region-
unconventional-threats-rising-russia/, 20 April 2016. US Army colonel Mastriano insists 
that this scenario is a real possibility. “Hiding behind the veil of ambiguity, the unrest 
would appear local. In such a context it would be difficult to convince all twenty-eight 
NATO nations to agree to implement Article V. If NATO dithers in responding and the 
security situation deteriorates, then Moscow has the initiative. In a simple stroke, the 
Kremlin could announce that it will ‘temporarily’ deploy forces to the troubled area for 
humanitarian reasons, and promise to withdrawal once order is restored.“ 
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Iran and Hizbollah. The Ankara’s war against radical Kurdish guerillas will 
certainly impact on the Black Sea area security while ISIS activities could reach 
also other Black Sea states beginning with Russia: at least 3000 ISIS fighters 
are from Russian Federation and some of them will try to come back at some 
moment. The Syrian migration could affect also other Black Sea states, not only 
Turkey. Some Syrian Circassians already relocated in Russian Federation, 
fleeing the war in their country. Syrian circassians are about 100.000 and their 
ancestors have been expelled by the Czarist Empire from North-West Caucasus 
in the 19th century, a land they still consider as “historic homeland”71. Moscow 
is also supporting the Syrian Kurds as a tool for pressuring Turkey and in 
February this year announced its will to open a Syrian Kurd representative 
office in Moscow72. The USA also supports Syrian Kurds as the only strong 
local force to fight against ISIS.  
What we are seeing now in the WBSA is a competition for power and 
security, in a self-help pattern, which translated into mechanisms of security 
dilemma73. Both Russia and NATO states are caught in an arms race since they 
don’t trust each other and interpret their speeches and actions as mutually 
hostile. NATO states prepare for the Warsaw Summit very soon and all of them 
are eager to increase military spending at the level of 2% GDP while acquiring 
new weapons like F16 jets, corvettes, submarines, helicopters, anti-air defences 
etc. Turkey was caught in a dangerous security pattern with Russia at the end of 
2015, with Kurdish extremisms and ISIS as direct foes, thus being forced to 
increase the size and endowment of its armed forces. Romania and Bulgaria do 
increase their spendings on defence and try to implement the “smart defence” 
concept with NATO, plus “pooling and sharing” with the EU, because of the 
Russian threat. SIPRI Trends in Military Expenditures 2016 asserted that in 
Central Europe increased the military budget with 13% “largely prompted by 
fears of Russian aggression following the Ukraine crisis”74. 
                                                 
71
  Fred Weir, “Russia as Safe Zone for Syrian Refugees? It's Not as Odd as You'd Think”, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2015/0916/Russia-as-safe-zone-for-Syrian-refugees-It-s-
not-as-odd-as-you-d-think, posted on 16 September 2015.  
72
  Serghei Demidenko, “Why Moscow Supports Syrian Kurdistan”, http://in.rbth.com/ 
opinion/2016/03/25/why-moscow-supports-syrian-kurdistan_579021, 26 March 2016. 
73
  A well-known mechanism explaining the escalation to military conflict in the relations 
between two or more states which perceive themselves as rival ones, the security dilemma 
is at a centre of a rich literature of the Realist and Neorealist schools in IR. See John Herz, 
“Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma”, World Politics, vol. 2, no. 2, 1950, 
pp. 171-201 and Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma”, World 
Politics, vol. 30, no. 2, January 1978, pp. 167-174; also Idem, Perception and 
Misperception in International Politics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1978, 
pp. 58-113. 
74
  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Retrieved 5 April 2016, 
http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1604.pdf, p. 1. 
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Ukraine, confronted with a low intensity war in the East (the Minsk II 
agreement is frequently violated) asked and received non-lethal equippment 
from NATO states and will probably buy lethal equipment from other sources 
like Pakistan, India or African states, also increasing the defence budget in spite 
of the poor economic situation. Only Moldova and Georgia are likely to keep 
almost the same level of defence expenses because of their economic weakness and 
cleavages among their populations concerning the behaviour towards Russia. 
Security dilemma pits a revisionist state against status quo ones but also 
two or more revisionist states who want to improve their power levels. 
Accidentally, even two satisfied states could be engulfed in it, but the likelihood 
of misperceptions and misteps is lower. MIT Political Science professor 
Stephen Van Evera stated that: 
 
‘‘States mobilize or attack because they see a first-move advantage, and they 
fear attack by another because they think the other fears their own attack and may move 
to forestall it”75. 
 
As some neorealist authors teach us (Charles Glaser is a good example) 
even satisfied countries could act in an aggresive way, enlarging their territories 
or their allies number to protect themselves, to control a territory which is seen 
as a cordon sanitaire against an aggresor76. Greed-led states and security-
seeking states may interact in non-predictable patterns, as each of them 
calculate the other’s material forces and intentions or motivation. Offensive 
neorealist John Mearsheimer insisted on the fact that satisfied states who are 
afraid of reckless one will become “first movers” and the only way to be 
protected from an aggressor’s attack is to be powerful and be able to inflict a 
great damage on the aggressor. It could be more easy to use the internal balance 
than to create a coalition because of the risk of cheating and because of the fact 
that some great powers “are prone to act in a foolish way”77. Thus, satisfied 
states which feel threatened could sometimes go on the offensive knowing the 
risk to enter an open conflict with an aggressive revisionist state but without 
other security alternative.  
                                                 
75
  S. Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, 1999, p. 44. 
76
  Ch. Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, and Oxford, 2010, p. 36. He stated that: “Expansion could increase a state’s 
security in a variety of ways, including increasing its resources and resource autonomy; 
decreasing its adversary’s resources and in extreme cases eliminating its adversary as a 
sovereign state; and improving its ability to employ its resources effectively by, for 
example, providing a buffer zone against invasion, strategic depth, or more defensible 
borders. Similarly, even if it did not desire additional territory, a security seeker might 
start a war to weaken its adversary, thereby increasing its own security”. 
77
  John J. Mearsheimer, “Realists as Idealists”, Security Studies, vol. 20, 2011, pp. 424-430. 
See especially pp. 429-430. 
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It is possible that Russia is acting defensively and sees NATO and EU 
as western intruders in its space of interest but it is perceived in the West as an 
aggresive and revisionist state which violates international law with impunity. 
The West and especially the USA are not ready to recognize a Russian sphere of 
interest the way that Mr. Putin would like it. Even if the German foreign affairs 
minister W. Steinmeier asked NATO states to avoid provoking Russia stating 
that “what we shouldn't do now is to inflame the situation by loud sabre-rattling 
and shrill war cries”, and “whoever believes that symbolic tank parades on the 
alliance's eastern border will bring more security is mistaken”, the fact is that at 
least from the NATO’s eastern members the requirements for new allied forces 
to be deployed there are more and more vocal78. Ukraine and Syria has been de 
facto connected by Russian military involvement, catching NATO state Turkey 
in a strategic encirclement and puting an end to Ankara’s doctrine of “strategic 
depth” and “zero conflicts with the neighbors”. Security dilemmas could be 
avoided only by dialogue, transparency and confidence building measures. 
Former foes like Germany and France became partners and friendly states after 
World War II. Unfortunately, in the Black Sea area these elements are not really 
present in the NATO-Russian relations. On the contrary, arms races are visible 
while threats and intimidations are frequent. Both NATO states and Russia 
think they act defensively and depict the other one as being reckless. 
The offense-defence balance theory (ODBT)79 could give us a better 
prediction on future behavior of the strongest Black Sea states, Russia and 
Turkey. In our time, defensive and offensives military postures are not easy to 
differentiate and with the advancing missile shield technology (which is by 
definition a defensive platform), the ultimate defence (based on nuclear 
weapons) could become less dominant, thus enhancing the security dilemma 
                                                 
78
  German Foreign Minister Warns NATO of ‘Sabre-Rattling’ against Russia”, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-06-19/german-minister-warns-nato-of-sabre-rattling-
against-russia/7523520, accessed on June 18, 2016. Germany, France and Italy seem more 
favorable to Russia’s geopolitical interests in the East. Berlin has big economic interests 
in Russia: about 20 billion USD foreign direct investments in Russian economy and 45 
billion annual trade. Not to mention North Stream I and II (to be built). In june, NATO 
defence ministers agreed that 4 batallions will be deployed in the Baltic states, Poland, 
Romania, about 4000 soldiers. 
79
  The Offense-Defense Balance Theory was developed by some structural Realist thinkers 
(Robert Jervis) and military strategists (S. van Evera) about two decades ago and 
postulates that when defence weapons and strategies are more effective than offensive 
ones, major wars could be avoided and the status quo would be more easily preserved. 
The two kind of weapons must be differentiated and calculated by the antagonists. In 
reality this kind of perception could be erroneous and the calculations are difficult to 
make. As an example see Charles Glaser, Chaim Kaufmann, “What is The Offense-
Defense Balance and can We Measure It”, International Security, vol. 22, no. 4, Spring 
1998, pp. 44-82.  
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mechanisms80. Giving up nuclear weapons, then missile shields and adopting 
defensive postures could help solve this problem.  
Currently, no Black Sea NATO member could be seen by Russia as a 
dangerous ennemy, able to destroy its military capabilities and invade its 
territory. But they are seen as allies of USA and possibly of Japan, “trojan 
horses” taking part in the containment game against Russian interests. Russia 
seems anxious that it is gradually losing its capacity to be able to threaten 
neighboring states. On the other hand, Russia is indeed seen as a palpable 
danger by these NATO Black Sea states. They must assume the worst, in the 
logic of Offensive Realism, since the zero-sum game is considered the dominant 
power logic in the area. Since V. Putin suspended and had frozen Russia’s legal 
obligations under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, in 2007, 
the arms race began to affect also the Black Sea region. Arms control 
agreements are important in preventing spirals of escalating conflicts, they must 
be based on trust81. Or in the Black Sea area, increased military power is not 
based on trust and mutual norms. It is based on fear and negative 
emotions/images.  
There is a lack of an effective regional organization to deal with such 
spirals of conflict: BSEC is mainly economic, OSCE is not effective in conflict 
resolution, Eurasian Economic Union is the tool of Russia, while EU and 
NATO are not accepted by Russia. There are two possibilities: in spite of the 
defensive nature of missile shield and its claimed ineffectiveness when dealing 
with long range missiles Russian elites around president Putin may feel that the 
strategic balance in Europe is changing at the expense of Russian nuclear 
deterrent, or Russian elites know that the shield is not a real threat for their 
nuclear deterrent but for domestic reasons prefer to present it as a threat and a 
legitimate target for a future war.  
Of course, the debate on so-called NATO’s broken promises not to 
enlarge to the East, supposedly made by US president G.H.W. Bush to 
Gorbachev at the beginning of the ’90s still continues – it is not clear that the 
West made such promises or simply Russian leaders had the impression of a 
gentlemen agreement on non-enlargement, but “U.S. and allied policymakers 
should refrain from treating Russian accusations of a broken non-expansion 
pledge as deceptive”82. The truth may be that Russia felt betrayed and 
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  See as examples: Charles Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: 
Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models”, World Politics, vol. 44, no.4, 
1992, pp. 503-505, 508-510, 528-532; also Idem, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as 
Self-Help”, Security Studies, vol. 5, no. 3, 1996, pp.133-143. 
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  Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Relations, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1976, pp. 81-82.  
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  Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the 
U.S. Offer to Limit NATO Expansion”, International Security, vol. 40, no. 4, Spring 
2016, pp. 7-44, doi: 10.1162/ISEC_a_00236. The author stated that: “There are numerous 
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considered USA (the West) as a situational manipulator which broke its 
commitments when the opportunity arouse83. Of course, it would be difficult for 
NATO states to withdraw the promise they made in April 2008, at the 
Bucharest NAC Summit, that Georgia and Ukraine will be accepted as members 
in the future. At the same time, Russia is not ready to withdraw its forces from 
these countries to ease NATO’s decision on possible enlargement.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The competition between NATO states and Russia in the Black Sea 
area is based both on cultural and psychological factors like the western need to 
promote democracy and freedom in the neighborhood and Russian obsession 
with western complots aiming at subverting its buffer region and even changing 
the regime, also Moscow’s strong desire to shape a multipolar world system by 
working with China against the USA, while sabotaging the EU and favoring the 
coming back of European nation-states. It is also based on structural and 
material features such as the security dilemma mechanisms, arms races, the 
decline of Russian and other ex-Soviet states’ economies and decline/aging of 
populations, failure of socio-economic modernization, together with the global 
low oil prices which reduced Russian available funds. The personal views and 
perceptions of leaders also shape their decision-making process. All these 
elements push towards a dangerous zero-sum competition and a difficult 
dialogue, since the level of mutual trust is reduced.  
Hard power may be necessary for ensuring the respect of national 
interests but one needs also soft power. Russia tried to convince the other states 
that it has legitimate claims over Crimea but failed. But hard power in not 
enough. As Joseph Nye stated “a smart power strategy” must be based on “a 
liberal realist strategy emphasizing a just understanding of the limits of one’s 
power”, “developing an integrated grand strategy that combines hard power 
                                                                                                                       
reasons to condemn Russian behavior in Georgia and Ukraine, as well as against states in 
Eastern Europe, but Russia’s leaders may be telling the truth when they claim that 
Russian actions are driven by mistrust. This possibility has largely been obscured by 
discussion of whether an explicit, codified deal constrained NATO’s future. Because 
absence of a deal is not evidence that a deal was absent, NATO’s eastward march may 
have left Russia feeling isolated by upending the informal arrangement of 1990” (p. 43). 
83
  Shifrinson mentions the meetings in Moscow on February 7-9, 1990, between U.S. 
officials, led by James Baker and the Soviet officials led by Gorbachev and 
Shevardnadze, regarding German unification – Baker clearly stated that if the Soviets 
allowed Germany for reunification and being a NATO member, “there would be no 
extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east if Germany 
reunified within NATO by Secretary of State Baker, and their Soviet counterparts”. 
Ibidem, p. 23. 
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with soft attractive power into smart power of the sort that won the Cold 
War”84. In the Black Sea region Russia has more hard power than necessary and 
some soft power by using networks of supporters and bribe-receiving politicians 
in the West, but lacks the cultural attractiveness. Moscow is deficient in what 
Nye calls calculating the “probability of success in achieving its objectives”85, 
having a geopolitical and mythological imaginary based on the ideas of being a 
special nation with a special political and religious mission. Turkey has a lot of 
hard power and some degree of smart power by using the attractiveness of its 
movies industry and cultural models, the force of its economy plus its diasporas 
in the West, but this soft power is generally limited to Turk/Muslim populations 
in Europe and had severely diminished by its declining democracy and rule of 
law standards (the abuses against mass media), by the huge ethno-religious 
tensions at home (the Kurdish agitation) and its subversive involvement in 
Syrian conflict. Ukraine is deficient in both type of power, but recently it won 
the Eurovision musical contest against Russia, benefiting from collective 
emotions of European public opinion regarding the fate of the Tatars from 
Crimea. So, its soft power improved a little. Moldova and Georgia are even in 
the worse situation, poorly performing in both types of power. Finally, Romania 
and Bulgaria have medium-hard power capabilities and a small amount of soft 
power (cultural models – music, movies, theater, economic lobby etc), via EU 
membership. At the continental level, after United Kingdom would exit the EU, 
Germany will become the economically and politically dominant power without 
a peer86. UK is seen in Russia as a potential adversary, Germany is seen much 
more as a partner. The NATO Black Sea states like Romania would have an 
interest in keeping UK and USA involved in eastern flank defence, and avoid a 
too close partnership between Moscow and Berlin. The Great Britain’s future 
exit from the EU will complicate the situation of the European security, as 
London will remain a NATO member and during the process of exiting the 
Union, about 2 years, it will likely block any Franco-German attempt to create a 
European common standing army, with its own Headquarters, seen as an 
attempt to separate EU from NATO and to distance Europe from USA. These 
intra-EU and intra-NATO tensions could be beneficial for Russia, able to use its 
gas-leverage to try to enhance the split. 
The balance of power in the WBSA seems in a process of rapid change 
and the material data like economy, military, demographics are accompanied by 
the specific perceptions of the actors. Those actors which perceive their national 
power as weakening could have the tendency to act more assertively to prevent 
this trend. This could led some revisionist states to try to act forcefully and take 
                                                 
84
  J.S. Nye, The Future of Power, Public Affairs, New York, 2011, pp. 231-232. 
85
  Ibidem, p. 299. 
86
  See the interview of George Eaton with conservative politician Michael Heseltine, “They 
Have Swallowed Their Own Propaganda”, New Statesman, 29 May 2016, p. 26. 
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more risks to stop or slower these trends. EU and NATO must help their Black 
Sea members keep a stable and predictable security environment, remain true 
democracies and preserve the regional status quo. And also try to diminish the 
impact of security dilemmas and arms race with Russian Federation by using 
dialogue, incentives and good deterrence means.  
 
 
